On-Premises Ransomware Recovery for VMware Cloud Foundation
VCF 9.0 · Pages 7-82 · ID vvs-9x-ransomware-recovery
Key Components: VMware Live Recovery, vSphere Replication, vSAN Data Protection, NSX, vDefend, vCenter, VCF Operations, Carbon Black, CrowdStrike
External dependencies: This solution addresses on-premises ransomware recovery using an Isolated Recovery Environment (IRE) at a secondary VCF 9.0 site. The VCF 5.2 validated solution library instead covers Cloud-Based Ransomware Recovery via VMware Live Cyber Recovery SaaS. Compared with the cloud variant, the VCF 9.0 on-premises pattern trades SaaS convenience for data sovereignty, gives customers full control of the recovery stack (VLR appliances, NSX isolation, vSAN ESA IRE), and introduces Python-based nsxtRwrIsolationPolicies.py automation plus native VCF Ops integration for entropy-based detection.
External dependencies: Purpose: Detailed design, implementation, configuration, and operational guidance for recovering on-premises business critical workloads within an Isolated Recovery Environment (IRE) in a VMware Cloud Foundation platform, in the event of a ransomware attack in the protected instance.
33 design decisions. The Quality column is the Academy's assessment for defence practice; the VVS documents do not classify decisions by design quality (D133).
| DD-ID | Decision | Quality (Academy view) |
|---|---|---|
| RWR-VLR-CFG-001 | Deploy each VLR instance in the management domain. | Manageability |
Decision: Deploy each VLR instance in the management domain. Rationale: Consistent deployment model for all management applications. Implication: No significant trade-offs identified for this decision. Component: VMware Live Recovery | ||
| RWR-VLR-CFG-002 | Use vSphere Replication in VLR as protection method for VM replication. | Recoverability |
Decision: Use vSphere Replication in VLR as protection method for VM replication. Rationale: Storage agnostic; flexibility in storage selection; minimizes SRA compatibility overhead; Enhanced VR = direct host-to-host at target site. Implication: Requires TCP 32032 network connectivity from protected ESX hosts to recovery vSAN storage cluster ESX hosts and VLR appliance. Component: VMware Live Recovery | ||
| RWR-VLR-NET-001 | Place VLR instances on the management network. | Manageability |
Decision: Place VLR instances on the management network. Rationale: Co-locate with VCF components VLR must communicate with. Implication: No significant trade-offs identified for this decision. Component: VMware Live Recovery | ||
| RWR-VLR-NET-002 | Allocate and assign static IP to VLR instances. | Manageability |
Decision: Allocate and assign static IP to VLR instances. Rationale: Removes DHCP constraints/risks on management networks. Implication: Requires precise IP management. Component: VMware Live Recovery | ||
| RWR-VLR-NET-003 | Configure forward (A) and reverse (PTR) DNS records for each VLR. | Manageability |
Decision: Configure forward (A) and reverse (PTR) DNS records for each VLR. Rationale: VLR accessible via FQDN. Implication: DNS infrastructure must be available; must manage DNS records. Component: VMware Live Recovery | ||
| RWR-VLR-NET-004 | Configure VLR to use NTP servers (not VMTools). | Manageability |
Decision: Configure VLR to use NTP servers (not VMTools). Rationale: Ensures accurate time sync; prevents time mismatch between management components. Implication: NTP services must be available. Component: VMware Live Recovery | ||
| RWR-VLR-LCM-001 | Life cycle management of VLR via native appliance tools. | ManageabilityPerformance |
Decision: Life cycle management of VLR via native appliance tools. Rationale: VLR not managed by VCF Operations. Implication: Deployment, patching, updates, upgrades performed without native automation. Component: VMware Live Recovery | ||
| RWR-VLR-SEC-001 | Configure service account in each vCenter for app-to-app communication from VLR to vSphere, member… | Manageability |
Decision: Configure service account in each vCenter for app-to-app communication from VLR to vSphere, member of vCenter SSO Administrators group. Rationale: VLSR accesses vSphere with required permissions for DR orchestration + site pairing; VR accesses for replication; improved accountability; limits blast radius on compromise. Implication: You must maintain the service account's life cycle outside of VMware Cloud Foundation to ensure its availability. Component: VMware Live Recovery | ||
| RWR-VLR-SEC-002 | Configure password expiration policy for VLR appliance. | Manageability |
Decision: Configure password expiration policy for VLR appliance. Rationale: Align with org policies and compliance standards; only local users. Implication: Manage via appliance console or SSH. Component: VMware Live Recovery | ||
| RWR-VLR-SEC-003 | Configure password complexity policy for VLR appliance. | Manageability |
Decision: Configure password complexity policy for VLR appliance. Rationale: Align with org/compliance policies; local users only. Implication: Manage via console or SSH. Component: VMware Live Recovery | ||
| RWR-VLR-SEC-004 | Configure account lockout policy for VLR appliance. | Manageability |
Decision: Configure account lockout policy for VLR appliance. Rationale: Align with org/compliance policies; local users only. Implication: Manage via console or SSH. Component: VMware Live Recovery | ||
| RWR-VLR-SEC-005 | Change VLR root password on recurring/event-initiated schedule via console or SSH. | Performance |
Decision: Change VLR root password on recurring/event-initiated schedule via console or SSH. Rationale: Root passwords never expire by default. Implication: Must routinely perform password changes. Component: VMware Live Recovery | ||
| RWR-VLR-SEC-006 | Change VLR admin password on recurring/event-initiated schedule via console or SSH. | Performance |
Decision: Change VLR admin password on recurring/event-initiated schedule via console or SSH. Rationale: Admin passwords never expire by default. Implication: Must routinely perform password changes. Component: VMware Live Recovery | ||
| RWR-VLR-SEC-007 | Replace default self-signed certificate with CA-signed in each VLR. | Security |
Decision: Replace default self-signed certificate with CA-signed in each VLR. Rationale: All externally facing Web UI and cross-product communication encrypted. Implication: CA-signed cert acquisition may increase deployment preparation time. Component: VMware Live Recovery | ||
| RWR-IRE-CFG-001 | Configure isolated workload domain with 1x vSAN ESA storage cluster + 1x compute cluster with NSX… | PerformanceRecoverabilitySecurity |
Decision: Configure isolated workload domain with 1x vSAN ESA storage cluster + 1x compute cluster with NSX Edges and remote datastore from storage cluster. Rationale: vSAN ESA performance/efficiency/scalability via NVMe TLC flash; network-restricted environment disconnected from prod for safe ransomware recovery. Implication: Additional infrastructure and operational overhead involved (a dedicated isolated workload domain with a vSAN ESA storage cluster and a compute cluster with NSX Edges). Component: IRE | ||
| RWR-IRE-CFG-002 | Configure Tier-1 gateway and IRE network segment in isolated workload domain NSX. | RecoverabilitySecurity |
Decision: Configure Tier-1 gateway and IRE network segment in isolated workload domain NSX. Rationale: Connect recovered test VMs. Implication: No significant trade-offs identified for this decision. Component: IRE | ||
| RWR-IRE-CFG-003 | Configure DHCP service for IRE segment in isolated workload domain NSX. | RecoverabilitySecurity |
Decision: Configure DHCP service for IRE segment in isolated workload domain NSX. Rationale: Recovered test VMs receive IP addresses and DNS settings from DHCP server. Implication: No significant trade-offs identified for this decision. Component: IRE | ||
| RWR-IRE-CFG-004 | Use Python script to create different network isolation levels on IRE. | RecoverabilitySecurity |
Decision: Use Python script to create different network isolation levels on IRE. Rationale: Network isolation prevents lateral malware spread; allows granular behavioral analysis at different phases of recovery. Implication: Separate vDefend DFW license required. Component: IRE | ||
| RWR-IRE-CFG-005 | Configure org firewall to allow outbound traffic to EDR from IRE. | RecoverabilitySecurity |
Decision: Configure org firewall to allow outbound traffic to EDR from IRE. Rationale: Recovered test VM must access EDR portal for sensor install + security analysis. Implication: Network configuration required. Component: IRE | ||
| RWR-IRE-CFG-006 | Configure separate DNS server on recovery instance. | ManageabilityRecoverability |
Decision: Configure separate DNS server on recovery instance. Rationale: IRE must use DNS distinct from protected instance DNS. Implication: Additional infrastructure + operational overhead. Component: IRE | ||
| RWR-IRE-CFG-007 | Configure NTP server different from protected instance. | Manageability |
Decision: Configure NTP server different from protected instance. Rationale: IRE Internet path should NOT follow production workload path. Implication: Open access to Internet-based NTP server. Component: IRE | ||
| RWR-IRE-CFG-008 | Isolate vSphere Replication network traffic from all other traffic in both instances; in recovery… | RecoverabilitySecurity |
Decision: Isolate vSphere Replication network traffic from all other traffic in both instances; in recovery, isolate on vSAN storage cluster ESX hosts. Rationale: Security isolation via dedicated VR VLAN for replication traffic. Implication: Network configuration required. Component: IRE | ||
| RWR-VLR-VR-CFG-001 | Do NOT activate guest OS quiescing in VR policies. | Manageability |
Decision: Do NOT activate guest OS quiescing in VR policies. Rationale: Not all workloads support quiescing; may cause outage. Implication: Crash-consistent (not application-consistent) replicas. Component: vSphere Replication | ||
| RWR-VLR-VR-CFG-002 | Activate network compression on VR policies. | Performance |
Decision: Activate network compression on VR policies. Rationale: Reduces bandwidth for replication. Implication: More CPU at source and destination. Component: vSphere Replication | ||
| RWR-VLR-VR-CFG-003 | Configure PIT instances, keeping last 200 instances. | Recoverability |
Decision: Configure PIT instances, keeping last 200 instances. Rationale: Ransomware recovery needs comprehensive PIT history to find uncompromised snapshot; vSAN ESA recommended for values over 24. Implication: More retained instances = more disk usage on vSAN ESA datastore. Component: vSphere Replication | ||
| RWR-VLR-VR-CFG-004 | Configure RPO of 24 hours. | Recoverability |
Decision: Configure RPO of 24 hours. Rationale: Ransomware detection can lag for weeks/months; most recent replicas may also be infected. 200 instances * 24-hour RPO = up to 200 days history. Implication: Changes made after ransomware attack typically lost. Component: vSphere Replication | ||
| RWR-IRE-RP-001 | Use Python script to select replica from list and create test VM on IRE. | Recoverability |
Decision: Use Python script to select replica from list and create test VM on IRE. Rationale: No UI option to select required replica; ransomware recovery is delicate iterative process needing uncompromised snapshots. Implication: No significant trade-offs identified for this decision. Component: IRE | ||
| RWR-IRE-RP-002 | Use Python script to assign appropriate isolation level to test VM during analysis. | Security |
Decision: Use Python script to assign appropriate isolation level to test VM during analysis. Rationale: Isolation options limit access; Quarantined+Analysis permits EDR sensor install while denying general Internet access. Implication: No significant trade-offs identified for this decision. Component: IRE | ||
| RWR-IRE-RP-003 | Use EDR for security analysis on test VM. | ManageabilityRecoverabilitySecurity |
Decision: Use EDR for security analysis on test VM. Rationale: Recovered VM may contain malware; need to inspect OS + app vulnerabilities; monitor events. Implication: Separate EDR license; allow outbound to EDR; manually install sensor pre-analysis, uninstall post. Component: IRE | ||
| RWR-IRE-RP-004 | Use VMware Live Site Recovery to automate recovery from promoted (staged) image. | ManageabilityRecoverability |
Decision: Use VMware Live Site Recovery to automate recovery from promoted (staged) image. Rationale: Automated runbook for business critical workload recovery. Implication: No significant trade-offs identified for this decision. Component: IRE | ||
| RWR-VLR-SRM-RP-001 | Do NOT run test recovery of recovery plans. | Recoverability |
Decision: Do NOT run test recovery of recovery plans. Rationale: Changes made to remove malware are not persistent after test run. Implication: No significant trade-offs identified for this decision. Component: Site Recovery Manager | ||
| RWR-DNS-NET-001 | Configure DNS settings for each protected workload to use DNS servers across protected and recovery… | Recoverability |
Decision: Configure DNS settings for each protected workload to use DNS servers across protected and recovery instances. Rationale: Enables DNS resolution when recovered test VMs powered on in IRE or during planned migration/DR. Implication: No significant trade-offs identified for this decision. Component: DNS | ||
| RWR-NTP-NET-001 | Configure NTP settings for each protected workload to use NTP servers across both instances. | Recoverability |
Decision: Configure NTP settings for each protected workload to use NTP servers across both instances. Rationale: Enables NTP when recovered test VMs powered on in IRE or during migration/DR. Implication: No significant trade-offs identified for this decision. Component: NTP | ||
Prerequisites
- VCF management domain operational
- DNS/NTP configured
- CA infrastructure in place
Implementation Procedure
Implementation
Environment: VCF version in support matrix; configured per guidance; capture all Ransomware Recovery tab parameters; VCF platforms healthy.
DNS: Required DNS entries in forward and reverse zones
Network: Protected <-> Recovery connectivity with jumbo frames, Layer 3 routing, max 150ms latency; bandwidth sized with VLR Calculator
Software: VLR .iso image mounted on vSphere Client machine
License: VCF license per design (protected + recovery), VMware vDefend Firewall license for IRE isolation
Active Directory: Domain Controllers available
CA: Microsoft CA available
Workloads: Windows or Linux OS with latest updates + VMware Tools
Deploy VLR Appliance
- Method: Deploy OVF template in vSphere Client
- Placement: Default management cluster in management domain vCenter
- Storage: Management domain vSAN datastore
- Network: Management network
- Repeat For: Recovery instance using Planning Workbook for Recovery
- Vmdk Files
- VLR-9.0.3.0.XXXXXXXX_OVF10.ovf
- -database.vmdk
- -data.vmdk
- -support.vmdk
- -swap.vmdk
- -system.vmdk
- Customizations
- Enable SSHD: Selected
- Host Network IP Address Family: ipv4
- Host Network Mode: static
- Certificate Replacement
- Process: VLR appliance config UI (https://<vlr_fqdn>:5480) > Certificates
Steps: Generate CSR (Appliance certificate > Generate CSR), submit to Microsoft AD CS, upload signed cert back
Repeat For: Recovery instance
Day-2 Operations Tasks
Verify the pairing across VCF instances
After installation, outage or certificate changeLog in to the protected-instance vCenter (Administrator) > Menu > VMware Live Site Recovery; the status of VMware Live Site Recovery and vSphere Replication must be OK (green). If not, check network connectivity between all vCenter instances and the VMware Live Recovery appliance (VVS 9.X p.59).
Ransomware recovery runbook — checklist (Table 29)
At every recovery eventApproval (IT management, CTO, business users, stakeholders); activation and assessment (all prerequisites met: Windows JumpBox with Python 3 at the recovery instance, vcf-data-protection GitHub scripts cloned, vDefend Firewall licence, EDR account with CrowdStrike Falcon CID or Carbon Black and outbound 443); logistics (people and facilities for the whole event, VMware Live Cyber Recovery available in the recovery instance, replication status of the workloads, NSX Edge nodes up, network isolation levels created on the IRE); communication before and after.
Create the network isolation levels on the IRE
Once per IRE, re-run after NSX changesFrom the JumpBox run nsxtRwrIsolationPolicies.py against the isolated workload domain NSX Manager to create the isolation policies (QUARANTINED_ANALYSIS, EXTERNAL_OUTBOUND and the other levels). Verify in NSX Manager > Security > Policy Management > Distributed Firewall > Application tab that the ransomware recovery policies are listed.
Recover a business-critical workload from a clean snapshot
At every recovery eventRun python .\ransomware-recovery.py --recoveryVlr <recovery_vlr_fqdn> --primaryUser/--primaryPassword --recoveryUser/--recoveryPassword; select the impacted replication, the replica instance (use the entropy-rate timeline to pick a pre-infection point), the IRE compute cluster and VM folder; wait for "Task finished successfully" and "Created test vm with name <vm>-test-vm" (replication for that VM is paused). Before powering on, assign the QUARANTINED_ANALYSIS policy: copy the test VM instance ID from vCenter Inventory and run nsxtRwrIsolationPolicies.py --cmd assignRwrIsolationPolicy --policy QUARANTINED_ANALYSIS --vm_uuid <instance_id>. Power on, install the EDR sensor (Falcon or Carbon Black), inspect and remediate (patch, remove malware, behavioural analysis), iterate the isolation level (e.g. EXTERNAL_OUTBOUND) as confidence grows, uninstall the sensor, then promote the active image (pp.45-56).
Failover of the cleansed workload (Disaster recovery type)
After promotion of the clean imageVMware Live Recovery (https://<vlr_fqdn>/dr) in the recovery instance > site pair > View details > Recovery plans > plan > Recovery steps > Run; accept the confirmation; Recovery type = Disaster recovery (the protected VM is paused); Finish and verify the workload is operational at the recovery site (p.57).
Reprotect and failback (Planned migration type)
After a successful failoverReprotect the clean VM, then run the recovery plan again from the recovery instance with Recovery type = Planned migration to return the workload to the protected production site (p.58).
Password expiration policy (per local user)
Per policy, both appliancesSSH to <vlr_fqdn> as admin, switch to root; chage --maxdays <value> root, chage --mindays <value> root, chage --warndays <value> root; verify with chage -l; repeat for the admin user and on the recovery-instance appliance (defaults: root maxdays 99999 / mindays 0 / warndays 7; admin 99999 / -1 / -1 — Table 30).
Account lockout policy
Per policy, both appliancesSSH as admin; back up with cp -p /etc/security/faillock.conf /etc/security/faillock.conf-`date +%F_%H:%M:%S`.back; set deny, root_unlock_time (default 600 s) and unlock_time with sed -i -E on /etc/security/faillock.conf; cat the file to verify; repeat on the recovery instance (pp.61-62).
Shutdown and startup for maintenance
Data-centre maintenanceShut the VMware Live Recovery appliance down cleanly before hardware or power maintenance and start it afterwards; then run the pairing verification to confirm component integration.
Sensor life cycle
Per recovered VMInstall the EDR sensor manually on the test VM (Windows Server 2022 / RHEL 8 procedures, pp.47-55), monitor the EDR console during analysis, and uninstall the sensor before promoting the image (p.56).
Monitoring Points
- Verify Pairing
- Check: Status of VLSR and vSphere Replication = OK (green checkmark)
- Pre: Verify all replications paused (VMware Live Site Recovery > site pair > View Details > Replications > Outgoing = Paused)
- Verify VR and VLCR operational
- Verify: NSX Manager > Security > Policy Management > Distributed Firewall > Application tab - verify ransomware recovery policies listed
- Failover Failback Checklist
- Verify 'Task finished successfully' and 'Created test vm with name <vm_name>-test-vm'
- Inspect OS/app vulnerabilities on EDR console; monitor events; manually patch + remove malware; behavioral analysis
- Change isolation levels to iterate (e.g., EXTERNAL_OUTBOUND) and monitor behavior on EDR
- Windows: Download from falcon.crowdstrike.com > Host setup and management > Sensor downloads > Windows. Install FalconSensor_Windows.exe, enter Customer
Troubleshooting
Likely Panelist Questions
Q: Why an isolated recovery environment as a separate workload domain?
RWR-IRE-CFG-001: a vSAN ESA storage cluster plus a compute cluster with NSX Edges, network-restricted and disconnected from production, so infected snapshots can be powered on, inspected and cleansed safely; the cost is additional infrastructure and operational overhead.
Q: Why recover a test VM instead of failing over directly?
Ransomware recovery assumes malware is embedded in the snapshot data; the script creates a <vm>-test-vm in the IRE under QUARANTINED_ANALYSIS, EDR sensors inspect and remediate it, and only the promoted clean image is failed over (pp.45-57).
Q: How do you pick the recovery point?
Use the entropy-rate timeline (p.51 area) to identify when encryption started and select a replica instance before it; the script pauses replication for the VM while the test VM is analysed.
Q: Failover and failback types?
Failover of the cleansed workload uses Recovery type Disaster recovery because the protected VM is paused; after reprotect, failback uses Planned migration (pp.57-58).
Failure Scenarios
Trade-off Analysis
Guest OS quiescing off vs application-consistent replicas
Chosen: Quiescing disabled on high-I/O workloads (crash-consistent replicas)
Justification: Avoids the I/O stall and outage risk of quiescing; application consistency is handled by the application or accepted as crash-consistent.
Service account with Administrator-level rights vs least privilege
Chosen: vCenter SSO Administrators-group service account for VLR (RWR-VLR-SEC-001)
Justification: Required for DR orchestration and site pairing; compensated by a dedicated account whose life cycle is maintained outside VCF.
No test recovery plans vs recovery-plan rehearsal
Chosen: Do not run test recovery; validate with the IRE test-VM workflow and planned migrations
Justification: Load-balanced applications and DNS do not work in an isolated test network; the IRE recovery itself exercises the plan.
Quiz — Ransomware Recovery (VVS 9.x / VCF 9.0)
- 72 hours
- 24 hours
- 4 hours
- 1 hour
- Open
- Isolated
- Quarantined
- Quarantined+Analysis
- 100 ms
- 300 ms
- 50 ms
- 150 ms
- 902
- 32032
- 8443
- 443
- vSAN OSA (Original)
- NFS
- vSAN ESA (Express Storage Architecture)
- VMFS
- UI doesn't support NSX
- Scripts are faster
- There is no option in the UI to select a required replica
- UI is deprecated
- 500
- 200
- 100
- 50
- It is incompatible with vSAN
- It is insecure
- Not all business critical workloads support it, and it may cause an outage on high-I/O VMs
- It requires additional licensing
- 4 vCPU / 16 GB / 400 GB
- 8 vCPU / 24 GB / 826 GB
- 16 vCPU / 64 GB / 2 TB
- 12 vCPU / 32 GB / 1 TB
- Changes made to remove malware are not persistent after test run
- Licensing restrictions
- They corrupt replicas
- They are not supported by VLR
- > 0.3
- > 0.7
- > 0.5
- > 0.9
- No Access
- Read-Only
- Custom
- Administrators
- Planned migration
- Test recovery
- Reprotect
- Disaster recovery
- vcf-data-protection/examples/rwr-ref-arch/nsxtRwrIsolationPolicies
- vcf-data-protection/scripts/
- vcf-data-protection/examples/rwr-ref-arch/
- vcf-data-protection/examples/
- 30 days
- 365 days
- 90 days
- 200 days
Flashcards — Ransomware Recovery (VVS 9.x / VCF 9.0)
Labs
Lab 1: Deploy and Pair VLR Across Protected and Recovery Instances
Deploy VMware Live Recovery appliances in both the protected and recovery VCF instances, register with vCenter SSO, replace certificates with CA-signed, and create a site pair.
Starting State: Two VCF 9.0 instances (protected + recovery) with management domains operational, DNS/NTP/CA in place, VLR .iso mounted, Planning and Preparation Workbook complete.
- Log in to protected mgmt vCenter; Deploy OVF template from VLR .iso (.ovf + .vmdk files) on default mgmt cluster
- Configure: Enable SSHD=Selected, Host network IP family=ipv4, Host network mode=static
- Power on VLR appliance; confirm boot
- Browse to https://<vlr_fqdn>:5480; log in as admin
- Certificates > Appliance certificate > Generate CSR
- Submit CSR to Microsoft AD CS; get signed cert
- Certificates > Appliance certificate > Change > Use CA-signed from CSR; upload
- In protected vCenter, create SSO service account (vsphere.local); add to Administrators group
- Back to VLR 5480: Summary > Configure appliance; PSC port=443; select target vCenter; Extension ID=com.vmware.vcDr
- Repeat entire procedure on recovery instance
- In protected vCenter: VMware Live Cyber Recovery > Open > New site pair
- Pair type: 'Pair with peer vCenter Server in different SSO domain'; PSC port 443
- Services: VMware Live Cyber Recovery + vSphere Replication
- Finish site pair; verify VLR Status + VR Status = OK (green)
Lab 2: Configure IRE Network Isolation Levels via Python Script
Create Tier-1 gateway + IRE segment with DHCP in the isolated workload domain, deploy 8 network isolation levels via the Python script, and assign QUARANTINED_ANALYSIS policy to a test VM.
Starting State: Recovery VCF instance with isolated workload domain deployed (compute cluster + vSAN ESA storage cluster). vDefend Firewall license applied. Windows Jump Box with Python 3 and vcf-data-protection repo cloned.
- Log in to isolated workload domain NSX Manager
- Networking > Networking Profiles > DHCP > Add DHCP Profile per workbook
- Networking > Tier-1 Gateways > Add; enable Route Advertisement (All Static Routes, All Connected Segments & Service Ports)
- Networking > Segments > Add IRE segment; Set DHCP Config > Segment DHCP Server
- On Jump Box, navigate to vcf-data-protection/examples/rwr-ref-arch/nsxtRwrIsolationPolicies
- Update constants.py CUSTOM_DOMAINS_LIST with your EDR vendor wildcards
- Run: python nsxtRwrIsolationPolicies.py --nsxManager <wld_nsx_fqdn> --user admin --password <pwd> --cmd createRwrPolicies --tier1_name <T1_name>
- Verify in NSX Manager: Security > Policy Management > Distributed Firewall > Application tab - 8 isolation policies listed
- Security > Policy Management > Gateway Firewall > Gateway Specific Settings > T0/T1 > Turn on gateway firewall
- Create a test VM in IRE cluster; copy its instance UUID from vSphere
- Run: python nsxtRwrIsolationPolicies.py --nsxManager <wld_nsx_fqdn> --user admin --password <pwd> --cmd assignRwrIsolationPolicy --policy QUARANTINED_ANALYSIS --vm_uuid <uuid>
- Verify policy is assigned in NSX Manager (VM appears in OnPrem-RWR-Isolation-Quarantined-Analysis-VMs group)
Lab 3: Full Ransomware Recovery Workflow - Recover a Workload from a Clean Snapshot
Simulate a ransomware attack (using entropy analysis), create test VM from clean replica on IRE, install/uninstall EDR sensor, promote image, fail over via VLCR, then reprotect and fail back.
Starting State: Labs 1 and 2 complete. Protected workload replicating to recovery with RPO=24h + 200 PIT. VCF Ops with RWR management pack installed; dashboards imported. CrowdStrike Falcon or Carbon Black portal access.
- Log in to VCF Ops; Infrastructure Operations > Dashboards > On-Prem RWR Dashboard
- Select affected VM; compare entropy rate + CPU trends
- Identify pre-encryption replica (before entropy jump > 0.7)
- On Jump Box, run: python .\ransomware-recovery.py --recoveryVlr <fqdn> --primaryUser <user> --primaryPassword <pwd> --recoveryUser <user> --recoveryPassword <pwd>
- Select replication (affected VM), select instance (clean replica), select compute resource (IRE cluster), select VM folder
- Verify test VM created: <vm_name>-test-vm (replication paused)
- Assign QUARANTINED_ANALYSIS: python nsxtRwrIsolationPolicies.py ... --cmd assignRwrIsolationPolicy --policy QUARANTINED_ANALYSIS --vm_uuid <id>
- In recovery vCenter: edit test VM settings; assign network port group (Status: Connected at power on); Power On
- Configure VM DHCP if needed; verify IP received
- Install EDR sensor: e.g., Windows CrowdStrike - download, FalconSensor_Windows.exe, enter Customer ID
- Inspect OS/app vulnerabilities on EDR console; patch + remove malware; verify clean
- Iteratively change isolation levels (e.g., EXTERNAL_OUTBOUND) and monitor EDR
- Uninstall EDR sensor before promote (avoid prod events)
- In ransomware-recovery.py console: 'Promote active image' (test VM deleted, image promoted)
- Log in to VLR /dr in recovery; site pair > View details > Recovery plans > plan > Run
- Confirmation: 'I understand...' + Recovery type: Disaster recovery > Finish
- Verify workload VM operational on recovery site
- Right-click recovery plan > Reprotect > confirm irreversible > Finish
- Monitor until Ready (if 'Reprotect interrupted' - retry with Force cleanup)
- Run recovery plan again with Recovery type: Planned migration (failback to protected)
- Verify workload VM operational on protected site